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Abstract 
This study looked at different views on the role of manufacturing during and after the 
Global Financial Crisis, as well as on the consequences for the economy. 
Technological change and the increase in productivity are believed to be one of the 
main causes of current unemployment rates. As a result, advanced economies are 
switching their employment base from manufacturing to services. This study aimed at 
proving whether this theory is true for the employment base in Spain. In order to do so, 
the overall performance of the Spanish manufacturing sector in the aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis was analyzed.  
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1. Introduction. 
This work seeks to offer an overall vision of Spanish manufacturing sector and the 
development of the sector during the last decade. 
The objective in the first section is to provide the reader with some knowledge about 
different views of how an economic system works. At the same time, we explain the 
background and main theories of each school of thought: from Classical and 
Keynesians economics theories to the recent Schumpeter theories’ adherents, through 
the different Neoclassical Synthesis. 
Section one also includes a deep explanation of two opposite views of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 and the causes behind it. Those two theories focus on 
manufacturing sector since they believe it played a crucial role during the economic 
downturn. On one hand, a work of Delli Gatti, et al. (2012) states that the main cause of 
manufacturing job losses is the high and rapid increase in productivity, which 
decreases needs of labor. On the other hand, Atkinson, et al. (2012) believe that 
productivity has been overstated by governments and the real cause behind 
manufacturing job losses is the decrease of international competitiveness and demand. 
As long as the previous theories have their roots in American economy, with our work 
we aim to study the appropriateness of those theories to Spanish scenario.  
In section 4 we offer a broad analysis of how productivity is measured, the different 
approaches, and the meaning of each of its components. This background will help the 
reader to understand the graphics and the different analysis provided in the next 
section. 
Finally, we analyze manufacturing performance in Spain after the global financial crisis, 
focusing on different productivity estimators and the evolution of the different sub-
sectors of this industry. We get to the conclusion that manufacturing job losses does 
not seem to be driven mainly by productivity increases, while a quite likely loss of 
international competitiveness can be. 
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2. Two different views of how an economic system 
works: New Classical and New Keynesians. 
Throughout the last two centuries there have been several perceptions of the capitalist 
economy, with different theories regarding how the market system works and why 
unemployment takes place. In this work, the main thinking movements throughout 
European history are analyzed: from classical economics, through Keynesians 
economics and the Neoclassical Synthesis, until contemporary school of thoughts 
(New Classical Economics, New Keynesian Economics and the New Neoclassical 
Synthesis).  
Classical economics, emerging in the late 18th, constituted a breakthrough from the 
prior widely accepted protectionist vision of the market. Accordingly to Smith (1776), 
the wealth of nations is based on the trade and not on the gold. Classical economists 
support price capacity to conduct information between consumers and producers, and 
the ability and power of the market to auto-regulate itself without constraint, fact coined 
as the well-known “invisible hand” by Smith (1776). Later on, Walras (1874; 1877) 
provided it with a mathematics framework in order to obtain a competitive equilibrium, 
also called Walrasian equilibrium. This concept sets “a vector of prices, and a 
consumption bundle for each agent, such that every agent’s consumption maximizes 
her utility given prices, and markets clear: the total demand for each commodity just 
equals the aggregate endowment.” (Levin, 2006). Besides, Walras (1874; 1877) added 
that “the fact that everyone in the economy faces the same prices is what generates 
the common information needed to coordinate disparate individual decisions”. 
Walrasian equilibrium theory has been strongly criticized and many flaws have been 
pointed out. As Kirman (1992) stated: “Given the arguments presented here-that well-
behaved individuals need not produce a well-behaved representative agent; that the 
reaction of a representative agent to change need not reflect how the individuals of the 
economy would respond to change; that the preferences of a representative agent over 
choices may be diametrically opposed to those of society as a whole-it is clear that the 
representative agent should have no future.” 
 
Classical vision of governments is just a merely provider of a legal framework. 
Classical economists consider unemployment below the natural level as temporary, 
since in the long run all is corrected by the price system. This aggregate supply-
focused view of the economy predominated until the Great Depression of the 1930s, an 
event that acted as a trigger for the polarization of the economics field.  
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Some economists, namely John Maynard Keynes, criticized Walras’ vision of the 
market, and consequently classical economists’, and shifted the attention from the 
supply side to the demand side arguing that the original recession causes could be 
found there (Keynes, 1936). The resulting theory, Keynesian economics, highlights 
cyclical shortcomings and the episodes of massive unemployment as a major problem, 
which could persist for long time, and doubts that market forces can cure it by 
themselves (Keynes, 1936). Keynes’ theories point out the incapacity of wages to 
readjust in the short run in order to clear labor markets, constituting the cause of the 
persistence of unemployment. Accordingly to Smith (1936) and O’Sullivan and Sheffrin 
(2003), government intervention, through monetary and fiscal policies, could restore 
the economy reducing the effect of inefficient macroeconomic outcomes led by private 
sector decisions. In Smith’s opinion, after reducing high levels of unemployment and 
boosting the economy, classical vision of the market could be restored. The following 
years after the Second World War experienced the extensive application of Keynesian 
economic policies in the United States and Western European countries (Jahan S., 
Saber A., and Papageorgiou C., 2014). 
The Neoclassical Synthesis is a consensus view of macroeconomics which emerged in 
the mid-1950s in the United States. It tries to bring together the two main schools of 
thoughts at the moment: classical economics and Keynesian economics. As Blanchard 
(2014) states: “it is a post war academic movement coined by the economist Paul 
Samuelson who brought both Classical and Keynesian’ Schools together.” The result is 
a Classical view of the microeconomics, focusing on Adam Smith’s invisible hand, and 
a Keynesian view of the macroeconomics, explaining the failures of the market 
economy and the needed action of governments in order to solve them (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 1987). This theory suggests that Keynesian economists are right in the 
short term, and classical economists in the long term. 
 
Samuelson wrote: “In recent years 90 per cent of American Economists have stopped 
being ‘Keynesian economists’ or ‘anti-Keynesian economists’. Instead they have 
worked toward a synthesis of whatever is valuable in older economics and in modern 
theories of income determination. The result might be called neo-classical economics 
and is accepted in its broad outlines by all but about 5 per cent of extreme left wing and 
right wing writers. ” (Samuelson, 1955, p. 212). 
Despite of neoclassical dominance of the economics field, it is actually a psychological 
theory. At the core of neoclassical synthesis’ theory resides the assumption that “all 
human decision making is assumed to be driven by the pursuit of individual 
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pleasure/happiness and its maximization” (Calleja, 2016). This type of self-interested 
and rational representative is coined as “homo economicus” or “economic man”. This 
agent pursues the “optimization of the utility as a consumer and profit as a producer” 
(Rittenberg and Trigarthen, 1996). The sum of all rational agents into an aggregate 
level led to the creation of a rational choice theory, also coined as Choice theory and 
Rational Action theory. This framework aims to understand and control social and 
economic behavior. 
Other theory of rational implications was that non-rational agents lose money, and in a 
medium/long term disappear, leading to the existence of just rational representatives in 
the market. 
Unfortunately for neoclassical adherents, their theories fail to explain properly business 
cycles. As Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987) point out: “Why did wages and prices not fall 
enough in recessions? Why didn't firms that wanted to sell more simply lower their 
prices? A quarter of a century of research failed to provide convincing answers to these 
questions. This state of affairs could not continue for long.”  
Additional problems aroused. Keynesian and classical economics criticized each other 
creating schizophrenia in the way that economics was taught. Microeconomists were 
accused for the lack of realism of their theories, while macroeconomists were blamed 
for the absence of theoretical grounds. This theorem lacked of explanation to some 
questions regarding failures of the market in recessions, such as the sluggishness of 
prices and wages and the causes of massive unemployment level. As a result of the 
confrontation between these two sub-disciplines, one of them had to be adapted to the 
other (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987).   
On one hand, New Classical Economics seeks to adapt macro models to 
microeconomic principles, namely the importance of dynamics in a world of rational, 
maximizing firms and individuals. Lately, this analysis has been coined as 
microfoundations. This School is also referred as the Rational Expectations School 
because expectations have a key role in shaping those dynamics. This tendency 
emerged in the 1970s in response to stagflation and Keynesians’ incapacity to explain 
what caused it. The new classical perspective is based upon three variables which can 
explain the sources of business fluctuations: productivity wedge, capital wedge and 
labor wedge. These economists also developed the use of representative agent 
models, not without being gravely criticized by other economists because of the 
incongruence between microeconomic behavior and macroeconomic results. 
On the other hand, New Keynesian Economics seeks to analyze the imperfect 
information and incomplete markets, and their importance in the existence of business 
IX 
 
cycles, with the consequent increase of unemployment and credit rationing. Since 
these episodes are incompatible with standard microeconomic theory, this school of 
thought derives its theory from microeconomic principles. Unlike new classical view of 
the labor market, new Keynesians do not believe in wages falling to market clearing 
levels. The reason is that when the wage level increases, labor turnover and 
productivity increases, but companies’ profits decreases. Consequently, firms which 
choose to low the wages face a decrease in the quality of the labor force (aka. 
productivity), bearing with some of the turnover costs and a decrease in their profit. 
Besides, there is interdependence among firms, where, theoretically, no one low wages 
even in the face of demand shortages. As a result, wage rigidities would explain, at 
least partially, unemployment levels during recessions. Analogous models are used to 
explain why interest rates did not fall to equilibrium levels in the capital markets. 
New Keynesian economics also attempts to interpret business cycles and the causes 
behind their existence. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987) explain clearly this concept: “The 
theory of business fluctuations it provides is simple: in broad outline, certain shocks to 
the economy affect the stock of working capital of firms. Even if firms had perfect 
access to the credit markets (that is, they could borrow as much as they wished, at the 
actuarially fair interest rate), the amount they would be willing to borrow is limited by 
their willingness to bear risk; the fixed commitments associated with loan contracts 
implies that, as the working capital which is available is reduced, the risk (bankruptcy 
probability) associated with any level of borrowing increases. Thus, if their working 
capital is reduced, their desired production level (given that they do not have fixed 
commitments to sell their products") is lowered; and it takes time to restore working 
capital to normal levels.”  
Other weaknesses from Keynes original theories are corrected by this new school of 
thought. Keynes’ aggregation of long term bonds and equities has been proved to be 
wrong by recent researches (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987). Risk properties differ 
mainly during recessions, when bonds raise while equities fall. Firm’s commitment to 
pay back both items also bears no resemblance: companies have to return a certain 
amount with bonds, while it does not exist such obligation with equities. These two 
main differences make bonds and equities greatly imperfect substitutes. 
More weaknesses have been found. Keynes’ first theories argue that the level of 
investment is affected through changes in the interest rate, not specifying whether it is 
the nominal or real level. On the contrary, new Keynesian economists establish credit 
availability as the major determinant, emphasizing monetary policy as a powerful tool to 
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mitigate the eventual shortage, even though it could be ineffective when a lack of 
willing borrowers exist, especially during recessionary periods. 
Nowadays, the predominant economic view is the New Neoclassical Synthesis which, 
as neoclassical synthesis did, combines elements from both major, modern 
macroeconomic schools of thought: new classical and new Keynesian. This tendency 
sets the parameters and theoretical grounds for much of contemporary mainstream 
economics and most of the actions carried by many European central banks and the 
Federal Reserve. The four central elements are costly price adjustment, intertemporal 
optimization, rational expectations and imperfect competition.  
Since late 2007, a global financial crisis has hit the international panorama and the 
causes and solutions are still under discussion. Evidence of this state of confusion is 
the intervention of the Queen of the United Kingdom, Elizabeth II, during a briefing by 
academics at the London School of Economics regarding the turmoil on the 
international markets (Pierce, 2008). The Queen asked why no one had noticed the 
credit crunch coming. After this, the Queen received a three-page missive dealing with 
it. It stated: "the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to 
head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective 
imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to 
understand the risks to the system as a whole." (Stewart, 2009). 
Arguments about the origin of the global financial crisis have mainly focused on 
traditional causes, as the excessive optimism regarding assets prices and their 
inherent risks, easy monetary policies and the creation of lax regulations. This 
circumstances led households and financial institutions to unsustainable levels of 
leverage, which after the collapse of the assets prices brought “widespread 
bankruptcies, foreclosures and impaired balance sheets among households, firms and 
financial institutions” (Delli Gatti, et al., 2012). Meanwhile, the recovery of the system is 
driven through the accumulation of savings and debt reductions. Nowadays, this 
constitutes the conventional vision about the present crisis. 
Another interpretation of the last Global Financial Crisis has been stated by some new 
Keynesian economists within the framework of the USA. On the basis that in any crisis 
problems in real and financial sectors are interwoven, last crisis was assumed to be a 
financial one setting a sense of preferences to governments. As a result, most of the 
policies undertaken have aimed to repair the finance sector, assuming that the 
economy would heal shortly after. However, the weaknesses in the economy are 
lasting longer than expected. For this reason, Delli Gatti, et al. (2012) hint at the failure 
XI 
 
of the analysis. In the USA, investment has not been particularly low during the present 
crisis, showing that financial sector is not a binding constraint for the economy, in line 
with new Keynesians’ view of the availability of funds as the major determinant. 
Besides, analyzing crises around the world shows that the strength of financial sectors 
does not seem to have a relation with the severity of the output declines. The United 
States and the United Kingdom had relatively smaller GDP declines than Finland, 
Denmark, Italy and Japan even though the impact in their financial system has been 
more intense. In other countries, as Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal, financial 
problems aroused after experiencing a real economic recession. Moreover, as Delli 
Gatti, et al. (2012) state: “the depth and duration of the present crisis is outside the 
normal range of post-World War experience”. 
New-Keynesian Economics introduces an “extended structural crisis operating within 
the framework of an asset-based cycle” (Delli Gatti, et al., 2012). From their point of 
view, the core of the problem is “the escalation of productivity in manufacturing at a 
faster pace than the increase in demand, being the latter negatively affected by 
consumers choice to spend a greater part of their incomes towards services” (Delli 
Gatti, et al., 2012). This imbalance of speeds leads to an increment of unemployment 
in the sector. As individual incomes fell, it affects negatively the demand in other 
sectors, especially the service sector. Shrinking incomes makes harder to incentive the 
transition towards the booming services sector, becoming that excess labor “trapped” 
in a dying sector exacerbating the fall on wages. There are some inevitable costs for 
unemployed workers when moving to another sector, especially when there is a 
geographical migration. Aside of this mobility cost, a retraining is also needed, since 
skills required in each sector are markedly different.  
Those countries with a large dying manufacturing sector which undergo a shift in their 
comparative advantages will face the most extensive structural transformations and a 
plausible sectoral dislocation (Delli Gatti, et al., 2012). This episode is similar to what 
happened during the Great Depression, when agriculture was the epicenter of the 
localized technical change. Income fell since the decline of the labor force could not 
neutralize the increasing productivity. 
New Keynesians defend the need of structural corrections together with Keynesian 
policies in order to stimulate the economy. On the contrary, new classical economists 
consider those policies as useless or even counterproductive. They believe that a new 
“normal” level of unemployment exists and the system must accommodate.  
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Recently, a new vision of manufacturing performance after the financial crisis has 
emerged. It confronts the perception of productivity as the main cause behind job 
losses. 
This perception has its framework within a considerably new school of thought: the 
Innovation Economics. During the last 15 years, this new economic theory has 
emerged based on Joseph Schumpter’s ideas. Schumpter (1942) introduced the term 
“creative destruction" in economics referring to “the process of industrial mutation that 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying 
the old one, incessantly creating a new one” .This process of restructuring 
and downsizing increases the productivity and dynamism of a company and constitutes 
what “keeps the capitalist engine in motion” (Schumpeter, 1994). This economic 
doctrine states that innovation is what drives growth, instead of capital accumulation as 
neoclassical economists assert. Since markets and price signals alone can fail to spur 
properly innovation and productivity, there is a need of specific policies, even if such 
policies affect negatively the way that markets operate. Governments should focus on 
helping organizations (e.g., entrepreneurs, firms, universities and regions), establishing 
public-private partnerships, and increasing public investment in innovation (Atkinson, 
2013). 
Followers of this tendency have strongly alerted about the mistaken perception that 
some economists are sharing to the world. Manufacturing has been losing weight in 
total U.S. employment with the share steadily decreasing since the 1950s. (Atkinson, et 
al., 2012). This fact has been used as an alibi by those who deny the U.S. 
manufacturing decline and argue a transformation of the U.S. into a “post-industrial 
economy”. They consider job losses as a proof of being an advanced economy which 
is moving “beyond all that commodity-based activity of actually making things” 
(Atkinson, et al., 2012). Some famous tabloids also reflect this thinking: 
“deindustrialization —the shrinkage of industrial jobs— is wrongly perceived as a 
symptom of economic decline, when it is really a stage of economic development, 
because as a country gets richer, it is inevitable that a smaller proportion of workers will 
be needed in manufacturing” (The Economist, 2005). 
Innovation Economics adherents refuse new-Keynesians’ dominant view of the 
decrease of manufacturing jobs for being essentially inaccurate. Superior performance 
of manufacturing is not the cause behind the huge losses in terms of jobs. While 
increases in productivity always play some role in employment falls, output decline has 
been the prevailing factor in U.S. scenario. Proof of this is 2010 production levels of the 
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19 U.S. manufacturing sectors: only 6 had production levels higher than in 2000 in 
terms of inflation-adjusted output (Atkinson, et al., 2012).  
In their opinion, government statistics have constantly been overstating changes in U.S. 
manufacturing output, helping to keep alarm bells silent. The Information Technology & 
Innovation Foundation (ITIF), strong supporter of Innovation Economics tendency, 
asserts that from 2000 to 2010 U.S. manufacturing labor productivity growth had been 
overstated by a 122 percent, while manufacturing output had decreased by an 11 
percent instead of increasing a 16 percent (Atkinson, et al., 2012). That loss of output 
is a function of the shrinking competiveness in global market caused by an abrupt 
increment in the manufactured goods trade deficit.  
Innovation Economics adherents have strongly criticized U.S. policies such as an 
uncompetitive corporate tax rate and the lack of finance to manufacturing technology 
support plans.  
3. The problem of “productivity”. 
3.1. What is productivity? 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001) defines 
productivity as a ratio between the volume of outputs and the volume of inputs. In other 
words, it measures how efficiently production inputs, such as labor and capital, are 
being used in an economy to produce a given level of output. The agency SPRING 
Singapore (2011) considers productivity critical for the long-term competitiveness and 
profitability of organizations since it offers a wide range of statistical information which 
allows comparisons and performance assessments. As Paul Krugman (1994) states: 
“Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything.” 
During last decades, companies have increased the emphasis on tracking the 
performance of their plants, departments and employers. Nowadays, analyzing the 
efficiency and overall competitiveness of a company centers most of managers’ efforts.  
Productivity measurement is a needed condition in order to improve productivity 
because it plays a crucial role in determining how efficiently and effectively an 
organization is performing. Measuring productivity appropriately has become a 
potential issue because it helps ascertaining the position in the market of each 
organization and avoids misleading conclusions. (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 
2010). It also provides a sound basis on how well an economic unit is progressing 
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throughout time (SPRING Singapore, 2011). Peter Drucker, widely considered as the 
inventor of modern management theory, states: “Without productivity objectives, a 
business does not have direction. Without productivity measurement, a business does 
not have control.” 
Productivity is commonly defined as a ratio of a volume measure of output to a volume 
measure of input use. While there is a general agreement on this notion, productivity 
literature exposes a confusing array of different measurements and purposes for its 
use. 
3.2. Components of productivity. 
3.2.1. Types of input measure. 
Input comprehends the resources used to obtain output. The most common forms of 
input are labor and capital. 
Labor 
Labor is a term which encompasses all types of employees in an organization. All 
working directors, proprietors, partners, unpaid family workers and part-time workers 
are included in this classification, if not specified otherwise. It has three ways to be 
measured: numbers of hours worked, numbers of workers engaged and cost of labor 
(SPRING Singapore, 2011). 
Chew (1988) states that measuring labor based on its cost can shed a misleading 
picture because workers’ salary cannot be related with their real productivity.  
Capital 
The Statistics New Zealand public service department defines capital as the volume of 
assets, such as buildings, machinery, computers and information technology, and land 
used by the organization in the production of goods or provision of services. Capital 
can be measured in physical quantity (e.g. number of machine hours) or in financial 
value, net of depreciation to account for the reduced efficiency of older assets. 
(SPRING Singapore, 2011). 
3.2.2. Types of output measure. 
Gross output 
Gross output can be defined as the sum of gross sales, receipts, or other operating 
income (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2014). It resembles to gross revenue. Gross 
output is flawed when counting transactions between companies within the same 
sectors because it double counts the intermediate goods. 
XV 
 
Value added 
Value added (VA) is the most commonly used measure of output. It represents the 
wealth created through the organization’s production process or provision of services. 
This measure avoids the “double counting” problem since it subtracts the value of 
goods and services used in production from the gross revenue. GDP is calculated as 
an aggregation of all sectors’ value added.  
In figure I we can observe how the combined efforts of employees, employers and 
investors produce the resulting wealth and how it gets distributed within some of the 
internal components of a business environment. 
 
Figure I: Value Added Distribution Process. Elaborated by SPRING Singapore, 2011.. 
SPRING Singapore (2011) supports that VA is a better measure of output than gross 
output because: 
• It measures the real output of an organization. 
VA provides a customer-centric perspective and focuses on the real value 
created by the organization, excluding supplies that are not a result of the 
organization’s efforts. 
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• It is practical. 
Measuring in financial units, as value added does, allows aggregating different 
outputs. 
• It is easy to calculate. 
VA can be obtained by the difference between a firm’s profit and losses. 
• It is an effective communication and motivation tool. 
VA provides a shared goal for employers and employees. The larger the value 
created, the higher is the wealth distributed. 
• It is applicable to both manufacturing and service industries. 
VA is measured the same way for both industries. VA can measure the 
commonly intangible output of service industries. 
3.3. Overview of main productivity measures. 
Ultimately, the choice among the broad range of productivity measures depends on the 
purpose of productivity measurement and, in many cases, on the availability of data. 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001). 
Productivity measures have two major classifications: single factor and multifactor.  
Single factor productivity relates output to one particular type of input. It is useful to 
identify the sources of aggregate productivity trends but it can lead to confusing or 
misleading results. Chew (1988) reveal this severe problem with the following example: 
Let’s imagine a hypothetical firm focused on the production of motors. In this firm, 
machines acquired castings counts as one step in its creation process. One day, the 
firm decides to buy that component premachined by another company. These new 
premachined elements have a cost 20% higher than the usual castings. However, 
buying them makes possible for the company to fire skilled workers and put up for sale 
the machine tools which they used in the production process. The result for productivity 
is an increase. The motive is that output has suffered no change, while the number of 
employees have decreased. Capital productivity also raises, since the asset base is 
lower than at the beginning.  However, materials productivity is much lower than before, 
because the value of acquired materials has experienced a growth of a 20% while the 
output has remained constant. 
In such a situation, a single factor productivity index focusing on capital or labor would 
shed a deceiving picture. This points out the need of using more complex 
measurements which get information from more than just two variables. 
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Productivity measurement should center its attention on a comprehensive range of 
capabilities and not just on one series of costs. It should approach how good a 
company is at turning a bundle of inputs into useful good or services. As Chew (1988) 
stated an effective productivity measurement requires the development of an index that 
identifies the contribution of each factor of production and then tracks and combines 
them. Multifactor indexes can present a problem because they sometimes need to 
gather data over lengthy periods of time. 
Table I presents the main productivity indexes organized by the type of input and 
output measure and number of factors used. 
 
Table I. Main Productivity Indexes. Elaborated by SPRING Singapore, 2011. 
Ultimately, the utility of a productivity measurement system resides in the correctness 
and appropriateness of its use when making comparisons. Nowadays, productivity 
indexes serve as a tool to analyze and contrast the performance of units at different 
levels: departments, plants, companies, etc. Those comparisons have a high impact on 
a large-scale range of decisions: budget allocation, management compensation, 
judgements about factory closings, etc. Consequently, managers must be cautious in 
order not to get a confusing picture. Their analyses should consider an overall 
perspective of the situation, accounting for changes in price and quality, relative 
performance and temporal trends, etc. (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2010). 
Another factor to take into account is not sacrificing factor for form. Constantly, 
managers seek to answer the question “how are we doing?” But a productivity index 
can only provide an appropriate answer if employers and employees understand it. 
Economists and mathematicians like to provide firms with complex functions when they 
combine different elements into one index. Logarithmic and multiplicative techniques 
are commonly used to identify the performance level. In a statistical research, this 
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perspective offers a wide range of advantages. As Chew (1988) explains “when the 
primary goal is to influence behavior, the simpler the better must be the rule If the 
people who use an index can’t understand it at a gut level, it probably will not affect 
their decisions and priorities.” Moreover, Chew (1988) also adds that “executives 
should seek the measure that promises the greatest impact not the measure boasting 
the greatest accuracy or technical elegance” 
A good measure to increase the value of a productivity measurement system is to 
incorporate workers in the design o department-specific productivity indexes. As a 
result, workers’ understanding will be higher and goal-oriented actions will have 
brighter results. 
Time is another factor which can also rise costs. Time spent to design and put into 
practice a productivity measurement system affects directly to the profit that managers 
can get from its implementation. Chew (1988) shows this dilemma with a manager’s 
statement: “Explain to me how taking an extra six months to get the measure more 
accurate is going to raise my productivity during those six months.” 
Finally, data presents the same difficulty than time. The analysis of the trade-off 
between a more accurate system and implicit costs needed to collect the extra data. 
4. Manufacturing in Spain. 
4.1. Statistical review. 
European Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) is a statistical nomenclature 
developed by the European Union in order to classify the different «statistical units» 
related to economic activity (companies, establishments, etc.). The goal is to create 
homogenous units to allow a wide range of international comparisons and analyses. In 
the last decade of the 20th century, previous versions of NACE classifications were 
reedited leading to an integrated classification system which all countries can use. 
Consequently, harmonized nomenclatures were set in a world, European Union and 
national scale in order to benefit the comparison of international data. Table II reflects 
the integration of economic activity classifications. 
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Economic structures change, especially due to the origination of new technologies that 
generate new activities and products. Furthermore, their importance varies over time, 
and so their weight in the classification system. Periodically, there is a revision of the 
nomenclature. On one hand, each revision improves the quality. On the other hand, it 
negatively affects the comparability of data over time and causes breaks in time series. 
As we can see in the previous Table III, CNAE are the initials that represent the 
national version of Spain. Currently, CNAE-2009 version is used in the Spanish 
framework. CNAE-93 Rev.1 is the former system originated in 1993 and slightly 
modified in 2003. As we can see, two different systems have been used for statistical 
purposes within last decades.  
Manufacturing, core of analysis in this essay, suffered a breakdown resulting in two 
new categories: “Electricity,  gas,  steam  and  air  conditioning  supply” and  “Water  
supply;  sewerage,  waste  management  and  remediation  activities” 
As a result, the comparability of data has become a laborious issue. 
4.2. Analysis. 
In our analysis, we have taken data from EUROSTAT database. This database, 
available online in “http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database”, includes a wide range 
of variables: absolute numbers, percentages, productivity indexes, etc. All our data can 
be found in the theme of “Industry, trade and services”. The period under analysis is 
form 2008 until 2013, with few exceptions depending on the availability of data. 
Similarly, the countries used to create multi country analysis are the ones without gaps 
of data in each time series. Once this condition was fulfilled, we chose the most 
representative countries within European Union.  
Manufacturing effect on an economy is not constrained to the direct wealth and 
employment that it generates. Additionally, an indirect effect exists. This effect comes 
from the impact of the value chain of all firms of the sector. These firms provide the 
sector with goods and services needed to their activity. Another contribution comes 
Table II: Integration of Economic Activity Classifications. Elaborated by: INE. 
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from families’ wealth because their income depends directly and indirectly on 
employment generated by the industry. Besides, those families also consume goods 
and services produced by different sectors of the economy, raising the indirect effect of 
the manufacturing sector on the economy. 
The manufacturing sector covers a wide scope of production techniques and activities. 
It includes from large companies producing complex products such as vessels to 
smaller enterprises employing classical production methods as the industry of musical 
instruments. At the NACE section level of detail, this variety is also present in other 
large and diverse sector as transport sector, construction and distributive trades. 
Regardless of this fact, the manufacturing sector still shows the maximum level of 
internal differentiation among the non-financial business economy. 
Manufacturing is the second biggest of the NACE sections within the European Union 
non-financial business economy regarding employment and the largest concerning 
value added. The levels were 22.4% and 26.2% in 2012, respectively. 
During last decades, advanced economies have experienced a decrease of 
manufacturing jobs to the share of total employment. The reason behind it is typically 
stated as the higher productivity of manufacturing compared with other non-
manufacturing industries. This fact normally leads to a modest and gradual loss of jobs.  
Starting our analysis in the subsector level, we look at employment evolution in each 
industry. As we can see in Appendix 1, in the national level, 22 of the 24 manufacturing 
industries experienced job losses in the period between the first trimesters of 2008 and 
2016. This adjustment has not been equally proportioned over the different activities. 
The most abrupt job losses have taken place in low-value-added industries most 
influenced by globalization. 60.92% of furniture jobs disappeared, a 56.44% in textiles, 
and a 44.12% in wearing apparel. Other industries least affected by globalization —
food products and petroleum refining— underwent some of the lowest job decreasing, 
or even a remarkable increase as the case of the manufacture of paper. Recent 
research (Atkinson, et al., 2012) has found that this inconsistency proofs that 
productivity growth is not the main cause behind the job loss over the last decade. The 
authors stated that “there is no reason why an industry like apparel should be able to 
attain productivity growth rates eight times higher than the food processing industry.”   
During last years, a transfer of lower-skill, commodity-based manufacturing from 
advanced nations towards lower-wage nations has taken place. Those activities are 
generally part of lower-value-added industries. Some economists argue that while 
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those lower-wage countries grow due to the mentioned transfer, developed nations, 
consequently, experience an increase on the international demand for their higher-
value-added products. In other words, global integration should lead countries not to a 
deindustrialization but to a transformation towards the production of more complex 
products. This is a way of maintaining a country’s manufacturing competitiveness and 
to alleviate consequences of a shrinking international dominance in traditional 
manufacturing. In this line, a recent OECD report found that countries as Germany and 
Japan have experienced losses in low-skilled manufacturing jobs while gaining in high-
skilled industries.  
In Figure II we can observe the composition of manufacturing sector by technology 
intensity of a group of representative countries. On one hand, Spain shows the 
smallness of its high-value-added manufacturing sectors among those countries. On 
the other hand, the size of the value added by low and medium-low industries is the 
highest. 
 
Figure II: Composition of Manufacturing Sectors by Technology Intensity. 2007. Source: OCDE. Elaborated by ABACO. 
In line with the literature, Spain should have transformed its manufacturing bases 
towards higher-value-added industries in order to maintain its international 
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competitiveness. It is believed that high-value added industries are going to be the 
most prominent growth sectors in the next decades. 
If we compare Figure II and III, Spain has barely restructured the composition of its 
manufacturing sector regarding technology intensity in the period from 2007 to 2013. 
Low and medium-low value-added industries still predominate in our territory. 
 
Figure III: Composition of Manufacturing Sector by Technology Intensity.  2013. Source: EUROSTAT database. 
In face of the recent global crisis and the effect on manufacturing jobs, with huge 
decreases in some countries as the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada, 
some economists state that full-time job losses in manufacturing do not show a clear 
picture of the underlying trauma that the industry is experiencing. This theory states 
that a big part of those workers who lost their full-time status have become part-time 
employees. The causes which drive this shift are an increasing productivity and more 
employment flexibility, together with a transitory economic situation. We know that 
involuntary part-time employment raises in the face of economic downturns. (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2008).  
In Figure IV we can observe the percentage change in the number of full-time 
employees in the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the first one of 2016. Mining 
and quarrying, construction and manufacturing show the biggest declines in the period, 
with levels at least three times greater than changes in other industries. 
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Figure IV: Percentage Change in the Number of Full-Time Employees. 2008-2016. Source: EUROSTAT database. 
In line with the theory that many full-time should have been converted into part-time 
jobs, we analyze in the Figure V the evolution in the same period (2008-2016) of the 
number of employees with each type of contract. As we can see, there has not been 
such a huge conversion between full and part-time jobs. Both variables have 
experience significant decreases, being prominent over full-time jobs, which have 
shrunk nearly a 30%. In percentage numbers, manufacturing had a 95.82% of full time 
jobs in 2008, which has decreased until a 94.45% nowadays. Consequently, part time 
jobs have experienced an increase of 1.32 points in percentage in this period of 8 
years. 
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Figure V: Number of Employees by Type of Contract. (Thousands). Source: EUROSTAT database. 
However, Figure VI shows how this transition between full-time and part-time jobs has 
had some effect on the economy at large. Part-time jobs in the whole economy 
represent nowadays the 15.7% of the total. This represents an increase of nearly 4 
points. 
 
Figure VI: Number of Employees by Type of Contract (Thousands). Source: EUROSTAT database. 
Table III includes the absolute values of both full-time and part-time. “Accommodation 
and food service activities” industry shows the greatest impact on the part-time jobs, 
followed by “transportation and storage” and “public administration”. 
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Table III: Manufacturing Sub-Sectors and Types of Jobs. Source: EUROSTAT database. 
Even though we verified that the theory regarding a transition from full-time to part-time 
jobs does not apply in Spanish manufacturing sector, we can still agree with those who 
claim that the manufacturing sector has experienced a decline. If we look at the total 
hours worked, we can assert that Spanish decline has been steeper and longer in time 
than others countries’ manufacturing sectors. 
In the following Figure VII, France could not be added for lack of data, even though its 
composition based on technology intensity resemblances more to Spain and Italy than 
the United Kingdom, as we could see in the previous Figure II. The United Kingdom 
has a similar base of low-value-added industries but nearly twice size of high-value-
added. 
We can observe the moderation of hours lost after 2009 until 2011, when the United 
Kingdom started to experience gains while Spain and Italy entered again into the 
losses path. 
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Figure VII: Total Hours Worked in Manufacturing (millions), 2008-2013. Source: EUROSTAT database. 
As we can see in Figure VIII, a common trend in the destruction of enterprises has 
taken place in the most significant countries of Europe. Italy, Portugal and Spain, 
countries where the global crisis has had a much bigger impact than the rest of the 
Eurozone, have undergone a continuous reduction of the number of manufacturing 
enterprises. Even Germany is showing difficulties to come back to previous levels of 
creation rates. However, France does not exhibit any problem to have higher levels of 
growth than the rest of countries. Besides, France has already reached the number of 
enterprises that existed prior to the global financial crisis. 
 
Figure VIII: Number of Enterprises (thousands). Source: EUROSTAT database. 
0
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
7.000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
T
o
ta
l 
H
o
u
rs
 W
o
rk
e
d
Spain United Kingdom Italy
0
100.000
200.000
300.000
400.000
500.000
600.000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
e
n
te
rp
ri
se
s
Germany
Spain
France
Italy
Portugal
XXVII 
 
If we were highlighting the capability of France to create enterprises, the following 
Figure IX shows that that trend of growth does not take place together with an increase 
of the production value. In this case, Italy and Germany are the countries which display 
the best performance. Germany peaked in 2011 a level of production value which 
overpassed the pre-crisis maximum. Italy is experiencing a continuous upward trend, 
not achieving pre-crisis levels yet. Spain has not been able to reach pre-crisis 
performance levels either. After the generalized downturn occurred in 2009, Spain has 
kept a steady level around the 425.000 level, showing an incapacity to grow a similar 
levels as its European neighbors. 
 
Figure IX: Production Value in Manufacturing (Spain). Source: EUROSTAT database. 
Eurostat defines value added at factor cost as “the gross income from operating 
activities after adjusting for operating subsidies and indirect taxes”. In Figure X we 
observe the development of this magnitude in the period between 2005 and 2013. 
Germany shows a much bigger value throughout all the period. The cause underlying 
is the broader bases of high and medium-high-value-added industries in terms of 
technology intensity.  
Spain constantly shows the lowest values and the worst performance, since the 
general recover which takes place after 2011 does not imply its manufacturing sector. 
The latter has been suffering losses on its value added at factor cost since 2010. 
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Figure X: Value added at factor cost in the Manufacturing Sector. Source: EUROSTAT database. 
Apparent labor productivity is obtained dividing value added at factor costs by the 
number of persons employed. Commonly, this ratio is measured in thousands of euros 
per person employed. The expression “apparent” highlights the fact that productivity is 
a function of not only labor, but all other factors and the way that they are combined. 
This variable measures the wealth generated, and it relates with the labor factor. The 
wealth originated is generally counted as the added value, measured in volume. Labor 
employed in the production process is quantified and used as a variable. But the way of 
measure it can differ substantially. First, there is an approach which takes into account 
the number of hours worked. However, our approach measures the number of people 
employed, obtaining an apparent labor productivity “per capita”, instead of an “hourly” 
estimator. 
With any of those approaches to labor productivity, putting a value to the input measure 
—either quantity of employment or hours worked— becomes considerably easy. 
However, estimating the output level accounting for changes in prices is highly harder. 
At this point, three main problems arise when evaluating growth in a country’s 
manufacturing level of output. 
Firstly, there could be an underestimation of the value of intermediate goods imports. 
Productivity growth can appear if a company decides to offshore its supply chain. Let’s 
imagine that a domestic manufacturer decides to switch its supplier from a domestic to 
a foreign one with a lower cost. The price of the input would drop, and the productivity 
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increase. Price indexes may fail to correct to this bias. Consequently, industries as 
manufacturing which rely considerably on imported intermediate goods can experience 
the overstating of their output growth. This problem is coined as the “import substitution 
bias”. 
Two other problems found in the American framework are the overestimation of output 
in the petroleum and coal products industry and a wrong evaluation of the rapid 
technological change in the computer and electronic products industry. However, this 
problems seem not to affect Spain manufacturing sector. Firstly, Spanish national 
statistical organisms, INE and Minetur, does not picture an incredibly high performance 
of the level of output growth in the petroleum industry in contrast to the statistics of 
other organisms, as it happens in the U.S. Secondly, a similar case takes place in the 
American sector of computers industry, not being found any similarity in Spanish 
scenario. 
Figure XI shows the change in apparent labor productivity in the period between 2008 
and 2013. Due to the great number of sub-sectors in manufacturing industry, 23 to be 
precise, we have just analyzed the 6 which show the most significant changes in the 
variable under measure, apparent labor productivity. 
In this period, the whole industry of manufacturing has experienced an increase of 1 
thousand of euros per person employed in the industry as a whole. This average is 
portrayed in the Figure XI compared to the 6 sub-sectors which most changes showed. 
Among the sub-sectors analyzed, manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
shows the biggest decrease, accounting for -10.9 thousands of euros, while 
manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers raised its apparent labor 
productivity by an 8.7 thousands of euros. 
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Figure XI: Change in Apparent Labor Productivity in Spain. 2000-2013. Source: EUROSTAT database. 
Figure XII includes the variation in value added at factor cost and the number of 
persons employed in 7 representative sub-sectors of manufacturing. 
Value added at factor cost measures the gross income obtained from operating 
activities. This variable adjusts its value for operating subsidies and non-direct fees and 
taxes.  
This estimator can be obtained as the total sum of turnover, capitalized production, 
increases of stocks and other operating income. Later, it subtracts decreases of stocks, 
acquisition of goods and services and other taxes linked to the products or the 
production of them. 
In Figure XII we can see how most of the sub-sectors and the manufacturing industry 
as a whole have experienced higher decreases in number of persons employed than in 
value added at factor cost. Manufacturing of food products have been the only sub-
sector in the analysis showing a positive evolution of the value added in the period 
2005-2013. 
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Figure XII: Value Added and Employment Evolution. Period: 2005-2013. Source: EUROSTAT database. 
Finally, our work make us believe that productivity gains are not the main cause of 
current levels of unemployment. Our analysis shows that increases in productivity are 
not consistent within all or at least a considerable part of the industries in 
manufacturing. It is complicated to state that productivity is causing job losses in the 
sector when it exits such a high level of disparity among each sub-sector. Besides, our 
analysis demonstrate that Spanish manufacturing sector can have important troubles to 
keep its competitiveness in international markets because of the predominance of low-
value-added firms. 
5. Conclusion. 
The aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis has originated a debate about what type of 
economic policies should be carried out by governments. For this purpose, a correct 
analysis of how economic system works should be elaborated. 
In our work, we aimed to shed some light on the performance of Spanish 
manufacturing industry after the crisis. We began with a multi countries analysis of the 
industry. We found out the considerable size of low-value-added industries in the 
economy. As different economists state, this fact can be detrimental to the country’s 
competitiveness in international markets. Besides, it may be difficult for the industry to 
recover pre-crisis levels in terms of employment and production growth. However, 
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Spain does not seem to be restructuring its manufacturing sector, since the percentage 
of low and medium-low-value-added firms is still predominant in our economy. 
Another argument used to undermine the current state of manufacturing sectors in 
employment levels is that full-time jobs losses can be explained as a conversion into 
part-time jobs. Our analysis shows that the mentioned process has not taken place in 
Spanish manufacturing sector. However, we can find this transfer or conversion of jobs 
in the economy as a whole. 
Manufactory sector in Spain seems to be suffering from a lack of output demand rather 
than an incredibly productivity raise. On one hand, productivity indexes shed some 
confusing signals about the performance of manufacturing. Value added at factor cost 
in most of the sub-sectors of the industry has decreased. Change of apparent labor 
productivity index shows a disparity among different industries. This makes more 
difficult to state that productivity is the main cause behind unemployment increases 
when a general pattern in the sector does not exist. 
On the other hand, total hours worked have experienced a steady decrease since the 
beginning of the Global Financial Crisis. There has been a constant destruction of 
enterprises with no forecast of changing. Production value has barely fluctuated in 
comparison to other European countries. 
For future works, we should analyze Spanish manufacturing sector more in deep. An 
analysis of productivity indexes in inflation-adjusted terms should be taken into account 
since prices variations can bias the final results. Besides, the evolution of the 
competitiveness of each sub-sector should be analyzed in order to point out the weak 
industries and look for specific measures to heal them. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
Employment change per sub-sector. Period: 2008-2016. 
